The actions and statements of the IDF may indicate an official willingness to conduct a sudden "humanitarian" evacuation of an additional thirty or forty yishuvim shortly after an Arab first strike. Thus in one quick blow, approximately 2/3 of the yishuvim could be taken off the map:

1) Arab Militia and Paramilitary Training in Judea and Samaria:
Recent Events & Actions by PA:

Starting in late 1997, widespread night fire around outlying yishuvim began. Later, in July through September of 1998, daytime fire also occurred. In October the firing tapered off to solely nighttime firing.

High-up PA officials announced that "we have succeeded in providing military training to thousands" for an attack against yishuvim.

Observations and Analysis of PA Gunfire by Visiting Military Advisor:

In November and December of 1998, a visiting military advisor travelling throughout Yesha analyzed the pattern of firing taking place. He noticed a burst of initial small arms fire from a number of weapons, followed by ten minutes of sporadic shooting. According to the advisor, this pattern of fire corresponds to the brief, intense burst of shooting that normally takes place during training for a final assault on an objective at night, followed by roughly ten minutes of sporadic gunfire while consolidating the objective. Although only the assault portion is audible, he added, this may actually be the final few minutes that would conclude two to six hours of silent approach to an objective under the cover of darkness.

Observations and Analysis of PA Training by Lt. Col. (res.) Yigal ben- David, Dec. 6, 1998:

"The invasion into Ariel yesterday, Shabbat, with the support of the Palestinian Authority, is without doubt part of a general plan to strike at the yishuvim, this time as a "dry-run" exercise. I have no doubt that these issues are known to you [Defense Minister Yitzchak Mordechai] and to the IDF . Their "police" forces (the name which is still stubbornly used to describe their army) comprise several divisions which include a number of battalions which are training to conquer yishuvim in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza."

Report from Military Intelligence Source in Shechem Area:

Three 2,000 man Arab paramilitary brigades have been trained to initiate attacks on three yishuvim in the Shechem area.

Importance:

A simultaneous night or pre-dawn attack would present Yesha with a fait accompli of 40 fallen yishuvim by sunrise.

Official Response:

When yishuv residents throughout Yesha reported the widespread instances of PA weapons fire, the IDF claimed that these were Arab "weddings."

2) Arab Commando Forces Already in Position:
Recent Events & Actions by PA:

There is confirmation of a 300 man Arab commando battalion in Shechem, and another commando unit at Arafat's headquarters in Gaza. Additionally, there is a credible report of a commando unit (Force 17) based in Hevron. There are also indicators of commando units in additional locations.

Importance:

Existing Arab commando units may spearhead much larger less trained PA armed militias in a surprise assault on Yishuvim.

Analysis:

The first overt military action taken as part of the Soviet first strikes on Prague ('68), Kabul ('79), and Vilna ('91) was Soviet commandos breaking down the door and taking over the control tower of the main airport at 11PM to open the way for troop entry and air landings of more commandos. In all three cases the Soviet commando mission included the seizure of key leaders and the elimination of communications, striking at the nerve center to paralyze the targeted military structure. There are indicators that such targets on yishuvim are being identified - see section #4 on Arab labor below.

The intelligence reports from Shechem may indicate the likely way that PA commando units would combine with Arab militias. Each of the three companies from the Shechem commando battalion could spearhead each of the three aforementioned Arab brigades. The commando companies would lead the initial entry, shooting the gate guard and then taking out the communications, alarms, and key leaders. That would leave the followup brigade to deal with the rest of the population.

Official Response:

Utilizing information provided by the author, residents of a yishuv near Shechem in late November 1998 confronted IDF Shomron Area Brigade Commander Col. Yehuda Shaked with the existence of PA commando units and PA armored personnel carriers. The Brigade Commander, unprepared to be asked tough, informed questions in front of a town meeting, attempted to double talk his way out of admitting this threat ("But the BTR-152's are just trucks .Yes, the PA has them, but not here - somewhere else "). Rather than initially answering regarding the 300 commandos in Shechem, the Colonel was more interested in ascertaining the source who leaked the information. In the end, Shaked's stammering unravelled for all to see, and he explicitly admitted the existence of the 300 man commando unit - letting the residents of that community understand that the IDF had been holding back information having life and death relevance to them.

3) PA Armored Vehicles:
Recent Events & Actions by PA:

The PA currently has acquired 14 mechanized BRDM2 platoons (42 BRDM2's), 50 BTR-152 armored personnel carriers, and a platoon of 30 flatbed trucks which have been reported transporting tracked armored vehicles.

Twenty-five BTR-152's with 12.7mm machine guns mounted on them arrived into the PA from Egypt in 1996, and 25 more were reported arriving in 1997.

Importance:

Because the IDF limits yishuv self defense to small arms, the growing armor vehicle capability of the PA would render the assault troops it carries invulnerable to yishuv defenders. The IDF gate guards do not have anything to stop these vehicles. The standard sliding gates for all yishuvim would buckle under the impact of such armored vehicles.

For a more detailed explanation of yishuv vulnerability to Arab armored personnel carriers, see addendum: "Arab Armored Vehicles in Yesha:

The Threat".

Analysis:

The PA armored vehicle force is not capable of challenging the IDF, but would be unstoppable in a first strike on yishuvim. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that that is their purpose.

Although it is possible to gain sudden entry into yishuvim by using commandos or even less prepared troops - as the examples of Ariel and Ofra show - armored vehicles provide a rapid capability to do so that ground troops cannot match.

Official Responses:

The most significant official response is the IDF refusal to provide anti-tank weapons for yishuv self defense. So far as we can tell, not a single anti-tank weapon has been provided to yishuv defenders or to any of the IDF gate guard contingents assigned to the yishuvim.

On December 9, 1998, the author contacted Moetzet Yesha for their assessment of the PA armored vehicle threat. They claimed to know nothing of PA armored vehicles, and referred the author to Michael Freund in Prime Minister Netanyahu's office who, according to Moetzet Yesha, is their contact for such issues. Mr. Freund also claimed to have no knowledge of PA armored vehicles, and would only discuss the illegal numbers of PA forces. Although Oslo allows the PA 42 BRDM2's, Moetzet Yesha and the Prime Minister's office still would not admit their existence. Apparently, Moetzet Yesha and the Prime Minister's office were either intent on suppressing information about PA armored vehicles or were so out of touch that they were not aware of the 42 light armored vehicles authorized by Oslo.

IDF Response to Ma'ariv Report of Armored Vehicles:

About ten days later, Ma'ariv ran an expose' of the PA armored forces (Dec 18`98). The IDF Spokesman tried to downplay some of the vehicles identified in the article and denied the existence of others. But the IDF Spokesman did not even address the most serious alleged armored threat: the fifty BTR-152 armored vehicles. Yet according to the aforementioned IDF documents, the IDF knew about BTR-152 vehicles in PA hands since 1996.

Repeated IDF Denials of BRDM2 Armored Vehicles in Ramallah:

In Ma'ariv of December 18, 1998, the IDF Spokesman, attempting to refute a report of BRDM2's in Ramallah: "As far as we know the Palestinians have 42 armored vehicles of the BRDM variety, all of which are stationed in Gaza."

In April, 1999, security officials from the Benjamin regional council requested a meeting with the IDF to discuss Arab first strike capability. The officials were told by the IDF area Brigade Commander Col. Gal Hirsch that the IDF is preparing for that very scenario, but that yishuvim in the Benjamin area face no danger, as the PA has no armored vehicles in Ramallah.

Although the IDF Brigade Commander of Benjamin in 1999 and the IDF spokesman in December 1998 would admit to 42 BRDM2's only in Gaza, IDF documents as far back as 1996 identified 6 BRDM2's in Ramallah.

Significantly, in November 1998, former IDF Brigade Commander of Benjamin region Col. Yossi Hayman explained in a briefing that the PA was completing the process of moving its power infrastructure from Gaza to Ramallah, as Arafat was trying to consolidate his control and wrest power from Arab extremist elements there. "Therefore," concluded Hayman, "Ramallah is becoming more and more qualified for hostile terrorist operations against Israeli targets in the Benjamin area."

The IDF explanation for why the PA needs armored vehicles according to Oslo is that Arafat needs them to protect his government from Arab extremist elements. This gives credibility to reports of PA armor in Ramallah despite IDF denials.

Analysis:

The IDF's repeated denials of Arab armored vehicles in Judea and Samaria appear to be intended to convince those residents that the Arab armor would only threaten to concentrate on yishuvim in Gaza. But evidence of first strike preparations against yishuvim of Judea and Samaria is growing. Thus, the IDF's recurrent attempts to convince some yishuvim to be less concerned because the first strike threat is directed against other yishuvim could represent an attempt to plant false hopes among some of them. Given the evidence of preparations against yishuvim of Judea and Samaria as well, the IDF recurrent attempts to divide yishuv security concerns from one another may reflect a fear of all the yishuvim uniting to stand together.

4) Arab Laborers on Yishuvim Detected Performing Intelligence Functions for Surprise First Strike:
Recent Events & Actions by PA:

Files in the Orient House and other locations contain topographical, logistic, military, and population information on every yishuv in Yesha. Arab laborers have been observed noting the homes of gun owners and potential leaders in each yishuv. Presumably, these reports are also going into the files of Orient House and would be the key documents used by the Arab commandos spearheading an assault.

Importance:

The above mentioned intelligence gathering procedures would give the Arab commandos the information they need to paralyze yishuv defenses within minutes of smashing through the gates.

Analysis:

Yishuv residents, concerned about the security of their families, frequently discuss the presence of numerous Arab laborers on yishuvim. Arab preparations to use laborers for a daytime first strike would be much different than the preparations required for a first strike at night. So the pattern of their preparations bears close observation as a way to determine what they may be planning:

Possible Arab Laborer Role in Day Assault:

During the day in several outlying, small yishuvim, most of the men who are armed are away at work and the Jewish population consists of women and children. Of those left behind during the day, few have weapons except for IDF guards with M16 rifles at the gate. Due to the flawed gate and perimeter security of yishuvim, Arab laborers would have no problem smuggling arms and ammunition inside. They could then easily overcome the two gate guards, take the arms room, and use the women and children as hostages. (Some yishuvim have banned Arab laborers, but the vast majority have not.)

Possible Arab Laborer Role in Night Assault:

The yishuv residents would be asleep. PA militia around the yishuvim can be mobilized under the cover of darkness to bring their manpower advantage to bear. Armored vehicles or commandos approaching the yishuvim would be harder to detect. The night-vision equipment in PA hands would allow the armored vehicles to approach the yishuvim without using headlights. The Arab laborers, knowledgeable of yishuv streets and buildings, would be attached to lead elements of the assault forces, directing them to vital targets in the yishuv. Vital targets include the arms room, alarm systems, buildings with communications equipment, and the homes of key leaders and gun owners.

Possible PA Decision for Night Assault Could Change in the Future: Given the aforementioned PA night assault training and equipment, a decision for a night assault may be currently in effect. However, the ease with which a hidden Arab arms cache could be planted on a yishuv for use a short time later could make a day assault feasible.

Official Response:

IDF countermeasures on laborers are badly misdirected or nonexistent. Some yishuvim even have Arab guards "guarding" the Arab workers. In many yishuvim, the IDF relies on ineffective "window dressing" security measures to give an illusion of security when in reality there is none. The author photographed and videotaped dozens of illegal Arab laborers freely entering holes in fences of yishuvim from nearby Arab settlements under PA jurisdiction, while IDF guards put on a show of checking magnetic ID cards at the main gates.

Additionally, thousands of illegal Arab laborers daily circumvent IDF roadblocks utilizing dirt roads in places such as Kiryat Sefer, Bet Lechem, Tzurif, Kalkilya, Ramot, and tens of others. This way, weapons could be smuggled back and forth from Gaza to Judea and Samaria and also into Israel within the green line.

When confronted with this problem by the author, IDF Benjamin Area Brigade Commander Col. Yossi Hayman admitted that the State of Israel needs those illegal laborers because of a shortage of manpower. He then said that he considers the IDF roadblocks which the dirt roads circumvent to be "like doors without walls .", and that "the IDF simply does not have the means to deal with the problem."

Officials in charge of security frequently point out that their priority is to provide the local Jewish residents with the "feeling of security." The creation of the "feeling of security" has replaced authentic security, which has apparently gone by the wayside.

Overall Analysis:

Lt. Col. (res.) Yigal ben-David's Assessment of IDF Policy; Dec. 6, 1998: "The current state of affairs spells out an abandonment of the yishuvim by the defense establishment and plays into the hands of the Palestinian Authority and its plans. I assume that you [Minister of Defense Yitzchak Mordechai] are aware of this dire situation."

A Possible PA Approach:

Politically, the PA forces would probably be directed to hold back from a massacre of the Jewish residents. Their orders would likely be to hold the residents under gunpoint until "humanitarian" IDF truck convoys arrive to evacuate them after daylight. However, even assuming that such discipline could be imposed upon the PA army forces, the larger armed civilian militias may not heed such constraints.

Netanyahu's Nine Part Security Policy for Yesha:

For three years, the Netanyahu government maintained nine policies toward yishuv security. Taken together, the nine policies present a pattern which could indicate an official policy that would not protect the yishuvim effectively against a PA first strike assault:

1. Not a single anti-tank weapon allowed to any yishuv to stop PA armor.

2. Denial of sufficient amounts of ammunition to yishuvim. The ammunition provided to each yishuv is enough for several minutes of combat.

3. A pattern of official suppression of information about the PA's specific first strike capabilities; e.g. armored forces, commando units, and night attack training. While occasionally publicizing information about the emerging PA threat, official and semi-official agencies such as Moetzet Yesha seem to avoid or evade any specific mention of first strike capability. They were generally willing to discuss large scale shipments of small arms, heavy weapons prohibited by the agreements, and other violations by PA, but when it came to first strike capability, the official answer always seems to consist of denial, avoidance, or silence.

4. There is no means for mutual support between yishuvim: The yishuvim do not have the equipment, training, or organization to communicate with neighboring yishuvim to provide early warning and coordinate defenses. They do not possess weapons of sufficient range to mutually support each other. In the current situation, the yishuvim could be isolated and overrun piecemeal.

5. Proposed security barrier plan for yishuvim may heighten vulnerability: The IDF and Moetzet Yesha propose erecting security barriers, purportedly to improve yishuv security.

   The barriers expand the security perimeters far beyond the numerical strength of available yishuv defenders to cover their perimeter with overlapping fire, making the barriers an indefensible trap for yishuv defenders in case of an attack. If the defenders withdraw to an inner defense perimeter, then the outer barriers would provide the Arabs with a control measure with which to deploy Arab troops on line for the final assault, in addition to providing cover and concealment for attackers to trade fire with yishuv defenders.

   The leaders of the Jewish community of Hevron examined the barrier plan and wrote a five page critique to explain its harmfulness and to encourage yishuvim to reject the plan. Most of them have.

6. Pressuring officials associated with Moezet Yesha and the civilian military liaisons ("Ravshatzim") to downplay the threat and hinder Yishuv residents from taking remedial self-defense steps on their own initiative.

7. Ineffectual instructions to yishuv residents from Ariel Sharon and Moetzet Yesha officials after Wye: Ariel Sharon suggested that yishuv residents should "seize the high ground " around the yishuvim to "create facts on the ground" to determine what the boundaries of Israeli sovereignty will be in the final status stage. Meanwhile, officials from Moetzet Yesha and Benjamin regional council invited yishuv residents to a briefing within the framework of the "Forum of West Benjamin Yishuvim," at which the spokesman presented colorful charts and maps tailored for each yishuv, depicting areas of "state land" for them to seize. Thus, officials of both the Israeli government and Moetzet Yesha were sending yishuv residents outside of the yishuvim while denying them the means to defend what they already have. These self-defeating instructions, while doing nothing to improve Yesha's security, do have practical effect, however: They serve to strain Yesha's overstretched defenders even further.

   One consequence of these instructions may be manifest outside Israel: This April, an associate of the author discussed the settler issue with a knowledgeable lobbyist for the pro-Israel AIPAC lobby in the halls of the U.S. Congress. When he brought up the looming danger to yishuv survival, the AIPAC official answered, "the only time we pay attention to settlers is when they seize territory."

   Apparently, among Israel's overseas friends, reports of settler seizure of territory are used to remind them of how settlers damage the "peace process." Meanwhile, AIPAC and other Jews and friends of Israel have not yet been alerted to the most serious concern: that the residents of Yesha may soon be cleansed.

8. Insistence on obsolete anti-terrorist scenario. The scenario calls for a yishuv self-defense sufficient to overcome a small handful of terrorists holding hostages inside a yishuv. Therefore, the scenario becomes the basis to equip and train yishuv self-defense forces at a minimal level which leaves them vulnerable to the real scenario which the IDF refuses to use - an attack by PA militia and/or armor. The inappropriate IDF scenario provides a doctrinal basis to deny vital anti-tank weapons to yishuv self-defense. It also limits yishuv self defense forces to a small size and allows only a handful of small arms.

   The IDF's insistence on the obsolete scenario makes no sense in terms of actual PA military capabilities but it makes sense if the intention is to keep yishuvim vulnerable. So far, the apparent deception has succeeded because the public is not experienced at analyzing scenarios and has found it easier to give Netanyahu and the IDF the benefit of the doubt.

9. The transformation of the IDF into a gendarme force. By denying the yishuvim the equipment, training, and resources to defend themselves, Netanyahu put the bulk of the responsibility on the IDF. This dictates tactics, leadership, equipment, and organization which saps the IDF's morale and resources, undermining its ability to deter or defeat invasion by foreign armies.

The erosion in morale and resources resulting from this situation is likely to cost lives if Israel goes to war. This approach may have turned otherwise patriotic officers against yishuvim which they now see as a strategic liability. This is particularly ironic, because if the yishuvim were empowered to defend themselves, they would be a strategic asset - helping to protect the IDF's back in its mission of holding the Jordan Valley line. Unfortunately, Netanyahu's approach has sewn hostility between the IDF and the residents of Yesha, instead of allowing them to function as a strategic team to protect the nation.

The Threat: Armored vehicles are a particular threat to the yishuvim because they can easily smash their way through yishuv gates. The armored vehicles could roam within the yishuvim because the IDF has withheld anti-armor weapons from yishuv stockpiles. The IDF also appears to be withholding information about Arab armored vehicles in Yesha.

The Soviet BTR-152 armored troop carrier was produced from 1950 to 1960, and has appeared in many variants and seen action on many fronts, including the Middle East and Afghanistan. The BTR-152 in Palestinian hands has a mount for the 12.7mm D.Sh.K. heavy machine gun. It has a 6x6 wheel drive configuration. It can hold 2 crew members (driver + commander) and 17 fighters. The BTR-152 is equipped with night vision equipment for the driver. It weighs 8950 kg and can travel at a speed of 75 km/h. It's power-to-weight ratio is 12.29 hp/1000kg making it capable of taking down the gates of any yishuv.

The BRDM-2 is a fully armored, four-wheel-drive, amphibious reconnaissance vehicle. It has two-pairs of belly wheels and a centralized tire pressure regulation system for increased cross-country capability. The BRDM-2 has a box-like hull with a boat-shaped bow. The engine is mounted in the vehicle rear and there is a small conical turret mounted on the hull above the belly wheels. The driver sits at the front of the hull on the left with the vehicle commander to his right. To enter the vehicle, the crew must climb through two roof hatches. The hull, which is constructed of welded steel, provides the crew with protection from small arms and shell splinters. The turret, which is very similar to that of the BTR-60PB and Czechoslovak OT-64, is located in the center of the vehicle and is armed with a 14.5-mm KPVT machine gun with a 7.62mm PKT machine gun. On either side of the hull adjacent to the crew position, there is a firing port. Immediately behind the firing port are three vision blocks which protrude from the outside of the hull, giving some vision to the front and rear of the vehicle. The belly-wheels are chain driven and are lowered by the driver and give the BRDM-2 improved cross-country performance and the ability to cross ditches. The driver can adjust the tire pressure on all four tires or individual tires while the vehicle is in motion to adjust to the ground conditions. The BRDM-2 is fully amphibious. It is propelled in the water by a single water jet at the rear of the hull. The vehicle has an over-pressure NBC system. The BRDM-2 is equipped with infrared driving and search lights, a radio and an inertial land navigation system. At the front of the vehicle is a winch which has 30m of cable and has a maximum load of 4000-kg.

Other armored vehicles residents should learn to recognize because the PA army may have them already or can easily get them from countries supporting the PA, such as Egypt or others:

Tracked vehicles or Half-tracks: White M2 Half-track; BTR-50, PT-76, BMP Wheeled armored personnel carriers: BTR-60, OT-62.

Machine guns given to Yishuvim are inferior to those in PA hands, giving PA forces standoff capability of close to a kilometer (The point may be moot, though, as the IDF is in the process of removing even the existing machine guns from some yishuv weapons rooms. Additionally, the IDF provides most yishuvim with only approximately 20 minutes of ammunition for a heavy combat situation.) The standoff capability means that even if the yishuvim were able to detect early warning indicators of a first strike and shoulder arms accordingly, they would still be unable to defend themselves. If Arab fire support is untouchable by the weak yishuv defenders, the Arabs can then quickly establish fire superiority - and can suppress the handful of yishuv defenders as Arab commandos and/or militia forces overrun the defensive perimeters. In such an assault, the type of barriers which the IDF has been proposing would serve as one more source of cover and concealment for the attacking forces, and even provide a convenient control measure along which to deploy for the final assault.

The penetrating power or force of the 12.7mm is roughly three times greater than that of the 7.62mm when compared in accordance with the physics equation (power equals mass times velocity squared).