". . . give me peace and we'll give up the atom. That's the whole story." Shimon Peres, December 22, 1995

Israel's policy of "opacity" or "deliberate ambiguity" on nuclear weapons is now faintly ridiculous. In essence, Shimon Peres already undermined Israel's longstanding commitment to keeping the bomb in the "basement" only weeks after he succeeded Yitzhak Rabin as Prime Minister. At that time, speaking with a group of Israeli newspaper and magazine editors, Peres advanced the idea of unilateral denuclearization in exchange for "peace."

Aside from the inherent foolishness of Peres's offer (Israel's relinquishment of nuclear weapons would assuredly invite genocidal war by several enemy states), the proposal was extended apart from any coherent strategic doctrine. Such doctrine, however, could provide Israel with broad policy frameworks from which particular decisions and tactics might be extracted. In fashioning its strategic doctrine, Israel must begin by addressing the following major questions:

Should Israel begin to identify certain general elements of its nuclear arsenal and nuclear plans? Would it be in Israel's best security interests to make certain others aware, in prudentially general terms, of its nuclear targeting doctrine; its retaliatory and counterretaliatory capacities; its willingess under particular conditions to preempt; its willingess under particular conditions to undertake nuclear warfighting; and its capacities for ballistic missile defense?

Although the answers to these questions would be necessarily complex and very general, one thing is clear: The Arab/Islamic awareness of an Israeli bomb does not automatically imply that Israel has credible nuclear deterrence. After all, if Israel's nuclear arsenal were seen as vulnerable to first-strikes it might not persuade enemy states to resist attacking the Jewish State. Similarly, if Israel's political leadership were seen to be unwilling to resort to nuclear weapons in reprisal for anything but unconventional and fully annihilatory strikes, these enemy states may not be deterred. If Israel's nuclear weapons were seen as too large and too destructive and too indiscriminate for rational use, deterrence could fail. If Israel's targeting doctrine were seen to be predominantly "countercity" oriented, Israel might be judged less willing to retaliate and/or less capable of actually fighting a nuclear war. If Israel's targeting doctrine were judged to be predominantly "counterforce" targeted (that is , targeted on enemy state weapons and supporting military infrastructures), enemy states could so fear an Israeli first-strike that they would consider more seriously striking first themselves.

Aware of the countercity/counterforce implications, Israel's leaders must quickly determine not only the best configuration of these two targeting doctrines, but also the most favorable means and levels of disclosure. How shall enemy states best be apprised of Israel's targeting doctrine so that these states would be deterred from various forms of first-strike and retaliatory strike actions? In any event, it is not enough that Israel's enemies merely know that the Jewish State has nuclear weapons. They must also be convinced that these arms are secure and usable and that Israel's leadership is actually willing to launch these weapons in response to certain first-strike and retaliatory attacks. Israel's strategic doctrine must aim at strengthening nuclear deterrence. It can meet this objective only by convincing enemy states that a first-strike upon Israel will always be irrational. This means communicating to enemy states that the costs of such a strike will always exceed the benefits. Hence, Israel's strategic doctrine must always convince prospective attackers that their intended victim has both the willingness and the capacity to retaliate with nuclear weapons. Where an enemy state considering an attack upon Israel were unconvinced about either or both of these components of nuclear deterrence, it could choose to strike first. This would depend in part upon the particular value it placed upon the expected consequences of such an attack.

Regarding willingness, even if Israel were prepared to respond to certain Arab/Islamic attacks with nuclear reprisals, enemy failure to recognize such preparedness could provoke an attack upon Israel. Here, misperception and/or errors in information could immobilize Israeli nuclear deterrence. It is also conceivable that Israel would, in fact, lack the willingness to retaliate, and that this lack of willingness were perceived correctly by enemy state decision-makers. In this case, Israeli nuclear deterrence could be immobilized not because of "confused signals," but because of signals that had not been properly distorted.

Regarding capacity, even if Israel were to maintain a substantial arsenal of nuclear weapons, it is essential that enemy states believe these weappons to be distinctly usable. This means that if a first-strike attack were believed capable of sufficiently destroying Israel's atomic arsenal and pertinent infrstructures, that country's nuclear deterrent could be immobilized. Even if Israel's nuclear weapons were configured such that they could not be destroyed by an enemy first-strike, enemy misperceptions or misjudgments about Israeli vulnerability could still bring about the failure of Israeli nuclear deterrence. A further complication here concerns enemy state deployment of anti-tactical ballistic missiles, which might contribute to an attack decision against Israel by lowering the attacker's expected costs.

The importance of usable nuclear weapons must also be examined from the standpoint of probable harms. Should Israel's nuclear weapons be perceived by a would-be attacker as very high-yield, "city-busting" weapons, they might fail to deter. Contrary to the conventional wisdom on this subject, successful nuclear deterrence may actually vary inversely with perceived destructiveness. It follows that Israeli nuclear deterrence requires not only secure second-strike forces, but also forces that can be used productively in war.

All this brings us back to the overrall importance of strategic doctrine. To the extent that Israel's doctrine actually identified nuanced and graduated forms of reprisal — forms calibrating Israeli retaliations to particular levels of provocation — disclosure of such doctrine could contribute to Israeli nuclear deterrence. Without such a disclosure, Israel's enemies will be kept guessing about the Jewish State's probable responses, a condition of protracted uncertainty that could serve Israel's survival for a while longer, but — at one time or another — would fail catastrophically and completely.