Nuclear war could come to Israel not only as a "bolt-from-the-blue" missile attack, but also as a result, intended or unintended, of escalation. If, for example, Arab/Islamic enemy states were to begin conventional attacks upon Israel, Jerusalem could respond, sooner or later, with nuclear reprisals. Or if these enemy states were to begin large-scale conventional attacks upon Israel, Jerusalem's conventional reprisals could be met (in the not-too-distant future) with enemy nuclear counterstrikes. A persuasive Israeli conventional deterrent, to the extent that it would prevent enemy conventional attacks in the first place, could substantially reduce Israel's risk of escalatory exposure to nuclear war.

But why should Israel require a conventional deterrent at all? Wouldn't enemy states resist launching conventional attacks upon Israel simply out of a well-reasoned fear of nuclear retaliation? By no means. Aware that Israel would cross the nuclear threshold only in very extraordinary circumstances, these enemy states could be convinced -rightly or wrongly - that as long as their attacks remained conventional, Israel's response would also be non-nuclear. This would imply that the only way for Israel to deter large-scale conventional war could be by maintaining visibly large-scale conventional capabilities.

Arab/Islamic enemy states considering first-strike attacks against Israel using chemical and/or bioloigical weapons are apt to take far more seriously Israel's nuclear deterrent. A strong conventional capability is needed by Israel to deter or to preempt conventional attacks, strikes that could, if undertaken, lead quickly via escalation to various forms of unconventional war. This brings to mind Israel's Oslo-mandated surrenders. Should Prime Minister Sharon accede to any further loss of essential strategic depth, Israel's conventional deterrent would be sorely undermined. This could mean, paradoxically, a strengthening of the Jewish State's nuclear deterrent.

If, however, Arab/Islamic enemy states did not perceive an Israeli sense of expanding conventional force weakness, these states - animated by an expectation of Israel's unwillingness to escalate to nonconventional weapons - could be encouraged to attack. The result here could be: (1) defeat of Israel in a conventional war; (2) defeat of Israel in an unconventional (chemical/biological/nuclear) war; (3) defeat of Israel in a combined conventional/unconventional war; or (4) defeat of Arab/Islamic enemy states BY Israel in an unconventional war. For Israel, even the "successful" fourth possibility could be altogether catastrophic.

The credibility of Israel's still deliberately ambiguous nuclear deterrent depends, in part, on the perceived "usability" of its nuclear arsenal. Should Israel's nuclear weapons be perceived by prospective attackers as very high-yield, inherently indiscriminate, "city-busting" (countervalue) weapons, rather than minimal-yield, "warfighting" (counterforce) weapons, they might not deter. Contrary to the uninformed conventional wisdom on the subject, successful nuclear deterrence may vary INVERSELY with perceived destructiveness. This means that Israel's nuclear deterrent requires not only secure second-strike forces, but also forces that could be reasonably used in war. It also means that continued "deliberate ambiguity" by Israel could create erroneous calaculations by prospective attackers, a situation that could plausibly undermine Israel's nuclear deterrent.

Perceptions are all-important in matters of Israeli nuclear deterrence. By keeping all elements of its nuclear doctrine secret, Israel could contribute to an impression among its regional enemies that Israeli nuclear weapons are unusable. Here, these enemies, unconvinced of Israel's willingness ever to actually use its nuclear weapons, could calculate the cost-effectiveness of striking first. If they were correct in such calculation, Israel could be overrun and destroyed. If they were incorrect, all states in the region - including Israel - could suffer consequences of multiple nuclear weapons detonations. Within the directly affected areas, thermal radiation, nuclear radiation and blast damage would occasion wide swaths of death and devastation.

Nuclear war would not respect political boundaries. Because of the manner in which nuclear explosions behave in the atmosphere, the altitude reached by the mushroom-shaped cloud would depend upon the force of the explosion. For yields in the low-kiloton range, the cloud would remain in the lower atmosphere and its effects would be almost entirely "local. For yields exceeding thirty kilotons, however, part of the cloud of radioactive debris would "punch" into the stratosphere, affecting the launching state and certain noncombatant states as well.

To prevent nuclear war, Israel needs an appropriate nuclear deterrent. But it cannot rely entirely upon this one base of national security any more than it can rely only upon conventional deterrence. Rather, it must now rely upon complementary nuclear and conventional forces, and upon the continuing and associated availability of certain preemption options. Taken together, these multiple bases of security could endow the State of Israel with critical elements of survival. Without all of these interrelated security foundations, Israel's future could include the palpably nightmarish visions of a regional nuclear war.