For nuclear countries in general, and for Israel in particular, there are very serious survival implications for choosing one strategy over the other, although it is also possible that a country would opt for some sort of "mixed" (countervalue/counterforce) strategy. Moreover, whatever deterrence strategy a country might choose, what really matters is what an enemy country PERCEIVES. In strategic matters, as in so much of life in all other spheres, the only pertinent reality is perceived reality. In choosing between these two basic strategic alternatives, Israel could opt for nuclear deterrence based upon assured destruction. Here, it would run an enlarged risk of "losing" any nuclear war that might still arise. This is because countervalue-targeted nuclear weapons, by definition, would not destroy military targets. If, on the other hand, Israel were to opt for nuclear deterrence based upon counterforce capabilities, its Arab/Islamic enemies could feel especially threatened, a condition that could actually heighten the prospect of a nuclear exchange.

Israel's decisions on countervalue versus counterforce doctrines should depend, in part, on prior investigations of: (1) enemy country inclinations to strike first; and (2) enemy country inclinations to strike all-at-once or in stages. Should Israeli strategic planners assume that certain enemy countries that are in process of "going nuclear" are apt to strike first and to strike in an unlimited fashion (that is, to fire all of their nuclear weapons right away), Israeli counterforce-targeted warheads - used in retaliation - would likely hit only empty silos/launchers. In such circumstances, Israel's only rational application of counterforce doctrine could be to strike first itself. If, for whatever reason, Israel were to reject preemption options, there would be no reason to opt for a counterforce strategy. Rather, from the standpoint of persuasive intrawar deterrence, a countervalue strategy could prove substantially more appropriate.

Should Israeli planners assume that the enemy countries "going nuclear" are apt to strike first and to strike in a limited fashion - holding some significant measure of nuclear firepower in reserve for follow-on strikes - Israeli counterforce-targeted warheads could have damage-limiting benefits. Here, counterforce operations could serve both an Israeli preemption, or, should Israel decide not to preempt, an Israeli retaliatory strike. Moreover, should an Israeli first-strike be intentionally limited, perhaps because it would be coupled with an assurance of no further destruction in exchange for an end to hostilities, such operations could serve an Israeli counter-retaliatory strike. This is because Israel's attempt at intrawar deterrence could fail, occasioning the need for follow-on strikes to produce badly needed damage-limitation. Israeli preparations for nuclear warfighting should not be understood as a distinct alternative to preparations for nuclear deterrence. Instead, such preparations could be essential components of Israeli nuclear deterrence. A vital connection may exist between likely prowess/success in war and the quality of pre-war nuclear deterrence. Looking back, it is plain that regional nuclear war is a distinct possibility for Israel, and that adequate preparations need to be made now to prevent such a war. These preparations will require, immediately, a clear awareness of how a nuclear war might start in the Middle East, and an informed identification of the best strategic doctrine(s) currently available to Israel. This is not a pleasant subject, but it must not be avoided.