Consider the following four distinct possibilities:

(1) NUCLEAR RETALIATION

Should an enemy state or alliance of enemy states launch a nuclear first-strike against Israel, Jerusalem would respond, assuredly and to whatever extent possible, with a nuclear retaliatory strike. If enemy first-strikes were to involve other forms of unconventional weapons, sometimes known as chemical or biological Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Israel MIGHT launch a nuclear reprisal. This would depend, in large measure, upon Jerusalem's expectations of follow-on aggression and on its associated calculations of comparative damage-limitation. If Israel were to absorb a massive conventional attack, a nuclear retaliation could not be ruled out, especially if: (a) the Islamic state aggressors were perceived to hold nuclear and/or other unconventional weapons in reserve; and/or (b) Israel's leaders were to believe that non-nuclear retaliations could not prevent annihilation of the Third Temple Commonwealth. A nuclear retaliation by Israel could be ruled out only in circumstances where enemy state aggressions were clearly conventional, "typical" (that is, consistent with previous instances of Arab/Islamic attacks in degree and intent) and hard-target directed (that is, directed towards Israeli weapons and military infrastructures rather than at civilian populations).

(2) NUCLEAR COUNTERRETALIATION

Should Israel feel compelled to preempt enemy state aggression with conventional weapons, the target state(s)' response would largely determine Jerusalem's next moves. If this response were in any way nuclear, Israel would doubtlessly turn to nuclear counterretaliation. If this retaliation were to involve other weapons of mass destruction, Israel might also feel pressed to take the escalatory initiative. Again, this would depend upon Jerusalem's judgments of enemy state intent and its calculations of essential damage-limitation. Should the enemy state response to Israel's preemption be limited to hard-target conventional strikes, it is most unlikely that the Jewish State would move on to nuclear counterretaliations. If, however, the enemy conventional retaliation were "all-out" and directed toward Israeli civilian populations as well as to Israeli military targets, an Israeli nuclear counterretaliation could not be ruled out. It would appear that such a counterretaliation COULD be ruled out only if the enemy state's conventional retaliation were entirely proportionate to Israel's preemption; confined exclusively to Israeli military targets; circumscribed by the legal limits of "military necessity;" and accompanied by explicit and verifiable assurances of non-escalatory intent.

(3) NUCLEAR PREEMPTION

It is EXTREMELY implausible that Israel would ever decide to launch a preemptive nuclear strike. Although circumstances could arise wherein such a strike would be perfectly rational, it is unlikely that Israel would ever allow itself to reach these dire circumstances. Moreover, unless the nuclear weapons involved were used in a fashion consistent with the laws of war, this form of preemption would clearly represent a most serious violation of international law. And even if such consistency were possible, the psychological/political impact on the entire world community would be negative and far-reaching. This means that an Israeli nuiclear preemption could be expected only: (a) where Israel's Arab/Islamic enemies had acquired nuclear and/or other weapons of mass destruction judged capable of annihilating the Jewish State; (b) where these enemies had made it clear that their intentions paralleled their capabilities; (c) where these enemies were believed ready to begin a "countdown to launch;" and (d) where Jerusalem believed that Israeli non-nuclear preemptions could not achieve the needed minimum levels of damage-limnitation - that is, levels consistent with preserving the Third Temple Commonwealth.

(4) NUCLEAR WARFIGHTING

Should nuclear weapons ever be introduced into actual conflict between Israel and its many enemies, either by the Jewish State or by an Arab/Islamic foe, nuclear warfighting - at one level or another - would ensue. This would be true so long as: (a) enemy first-strikes against Israel would not destroy Jerusalem's second-strike nuclear capability; (b) enemy retaliations for an Israeli conventional preemption would not destroy Jerusalem's nuclear counterretaliatory capability; (c) Israeli preemptive strikes involving nuclear weapons would not destroy Arab/Islamic second-strike nuclear capabilities; and (d) Israeli retaliation for enemy conventional first-strikes would not destroy Arab/Islamic nuclear counterretaliatory capability. This means that in order to satisfy its essential survival requirements, Israel MUST now ensure the likelihood of (a) and (b) above, and the unlikelihood of (c) and (d). Looking over these four different scenarios that could lead Israel to actually use its nuclear weapons, Jerusalem will need to choose carefully between "assured destruction" strategies and "warfighting" strategies. My next essay will explore these critical strategic alternatives.